15,730 kHz · AM · 2026-09-14 12:29 UTC
Station identity confirmed in the transcript
confirmed
“بیننده تلویزیون ایران اینترنشنال هستید” — seg-0003
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Music, then the presenter Reza Mohandes gives the time, the date — Monday the twenty-third of Shahrivar — and names the channel.
A day after Iraq closed its border crossings with Iran, the Iraqi prime minister met the French president in Paris, with oil exports and memoranda on energy and infrastructure as the axes of the talks. Heavy goods drivers remain stranded at the Iraqi borders — 'kilometres of queued lorries', a voice says, 'the people have shut it completely'. Iranian media warn of a steep fall in foreign trade under increasing American pressure. As fighting between the Houthis and Saudi Arabia intensifies, Mohammed bin Salman met the CENTCOM commander in Jeddah. On inflation: a shopper reports two portions of minced meat and a kilo of herbs coming to nine hundred thousand tomans, and citizens report selling household goods to buy medicine and food. And, incongruously, the English football authority upholding a VAR decision in the Manchester derby.
The border story is the same one Radio Farda reported at nine in the evening on 13 September — Iraq closing three crossings after the drone attack on the Saudi pipeline, then reopening them in stages. This picks it up a day later from a different broadcaster and adds what Farda did not have: the human consequence at the crossings, and the Iraqi prime minister in Paris looking for a way around the Strait of Hormuz.
The Iraqi prime minister — rendered in the transcript as Ali al-Zidi — travelled to Paris to meet Emmanuel Macron. His government's spokesman gives the purpose of the European trip as meetings with French and German officials and the signing of several memoranda on energy, infrastructure and investment; the future of the anti-ISIS international coalition mission, the regional crisis and oil export routes are also named as axes. Separately, a criminal court in Baghdad has issued an arrest warrant and an asset confiscation order against Omid Haji Ahmad, an Iraqi-British trader also known as Salim Ahmed Said, for the illegal sale of Iranian oil and ship-to-ship transfers. He had already been sanctioned by the US Treasury, which said his companies sold Islamic Republic oil as Iraqi oil using forged documents and helped finance the Quds Force.
A named trader, a named court, a named sanctions authority and a specific mechanism — forged papers reclassifying Iranian oil as Iraqi. It is the most concrete account of sanctions evasion the corpus holds. RESERVATION: the Iraqi prime minister's name is transcribed as 'Ali al-Zidi' throughout, which does not match the office holder; treat the name as unreliable and the office as sound.
Two correspondents outside the Élysée Palace. The first sets out the energy argument with figures: Iraq supplied eight per cent of France's oil in 2024, making it one of its largest suppliers, while ninety-five per cent of Iraq's own oil has until now passed through the Strait of Hormuz — so with the Strait in crisis both countries' interests require alternative routes. She notes Macron discussed the same question with bin Salman on 24 August, that Saudi Arabia has one of the largest east-to-west pipelines to the Red Sea and the UAE has similar potential, but Iraq has not yet built that position and is looking for a partner to invest. The second correspondent adds the security dimension: on 12 March, ten days after the war began, French forces were attacked at a base near Erbil — one French soldier killed, six seriously wounded — and it emerged that groups backed by the Islamic Republic had made the French in Iraq their target; the investigation's findings are still unknown. He says Iraq's accession to the international banking system will also be discussed, noting the prime minister's own social media report of a meeting with the head of Rothschild bank. On the arrested trader he describes a wide network operating through officials and members of parliament, and links it to the arrest two months earlier of Ali Mahdi Bahadli, a former deputy oil minister, seized along with many others and millions of dollars returned to the treasury. The whole cycle, he argues, comes down to whether Baghdad can convince Europeans and Americans that it will cut the flow of dollars to the Islamic Republic and abide by international rules — and so attract investment.
Live two-way reporting with named figures, dates and institutions, on a question this corpus has been tracking all week from three other broadcasters: how to move oil without passing through Hormuz. It also supplies a fact none of the others carried — a French soldier killed at Erbil on 12 March, attributed to Iran-backed groups.
Farzin Karbasi, described as a political analyst and journalist, speaking from Sulaymaniyah. He argues the Iraqi prime minister is pursuing two tracks. The first is freeing his government from the pressure the Hashd al-Shaabi — which he calls the Islamic Republic's proxy forces — exert on the Iraqi state, by taking weapons out of their hands and bringing them under military command. The second is economic: twenty-three or twenty-four years in which forces tied to the Islamic Republic held positions across government produced no progress and wrecked the economy. Hence the prime minister travelled to America immediately on taking office and signed energy contracts, and is now going to France and Germany. On outcomes he is specific: a 2008 contract with Total worth around twelve billion dollars has been raised to more than forty billion, with a target of ten million barrels a day; new pipelines are being planned to change the route and ease Iraqi oil exports. The consequence he stresses is that Iraq would escape dependence on Iranian gas, which he calls one of the levers the Islamic Republic has used to apply pressure.
The clearest statement in the corpus of the strategic logic behind the Hormuz story: pipelines are not only about shipping risk, they are about removing a lever. RESERVATION: the contract figures are the analyst's, given without sourcing, and one is garbled in transcription as 'forty and ten billion'.
Following the closure of the Chazabeh and Shalamcheh crossings by Iraq, contradictory news has been published. The Islamic Republic's foreign ministry spokesman says passenger traffic has resumed and commercial activity will normalise within two or three days; a member of the Iran–Iraq chamber of commerce says the trade crossings will open tomorrow; the head of the Khorramshahr chamber says Shalamcheh reopened for trade on Monday morning. While officials report other crossings including Mehran and Khosravi as open, a citizen reports Khosravi closed and lorry drivers stranded there, and is heard directly: forty kilometres of queued vehicles, 'the border is completely shut, they didn't even take my passport', officials telling him it is nothing to do with them, and his question about what to do with the women and children.
Four official statements that do not agree with one another, set against a recording from the queue. It is the corpus's clearest instance of a broadcaster using a citizen's voice to contradict a government spokesman, and the second such recording in two days after the water-crisis voices on Radio Payam.
A report in the newspaper Shargh is summarised: intensified American sanctions and pressure on financial and transport networks have narrowed Iran's alternative foreign trade routes and made moving money and goods more costly; after the severing of all financial and commercial exchange with the United Arab Emirates, Turkey is now applying American restrictions to its trade with Iran, while developing transit corridors that bypass Iran. Mahtab Alizadeh, an economic journalist in Berlin, is interviewed. On Iraq: few countries were willing to trade with the Islamic Republic even before the conflict, and the ring has tightened weekly since; Iraq carried a significant share of Iranian exports, some Iranian food brands and carmakers had built factories there, and it was one of the countries with which Iran's trade balance was positive — around twelve billion dollars a year in normal years, already down to nine billion by 1400. If the situation persists, she warns, Iran loses a permanent export customer and Iranian firms lose the Iraqi market for good. On Turkey she draws a distinction: the Islamic Republic does not have the political weight there that it has in Iraq, and Turkey is far more serious than the Iraqis about American sanctions — she points to the Turkish finance minister's recent remarks that Turkey will comply even on permitted goods such as food and medicine, and notes that Turkish banks have been sanctioned for dealing with Iran, so from now on they will be much more reluctant.
Named sourcing — a newspaper, a finance minister, specific trade volumes across two years — on the mechanism by which sanctions actually bite: not a single decision but the sequential closing of Iran's neighbours, one at a time. RESERVATION: several sentences in this section are syntactically broken and the twelve-to-nine billion comparison should be treated as approximate.
As fighting between the Iran-backed Houthis and Saudi Arabia intensifies, Mohammed bin Salman met CENTCOM commander Brad Cooper in Jeddah. Reuters, citing a source, places this a few days after bin Salman asked the American president for military help against the Houthis; three informed sources say Trump did not agree to direct American strikes, but Washington told Riyadh it would support Saudi Arabia with intelligence sharing and help identifying targets. Saudi Arabia's east–west crude pipeline remains shut after a drone attack. The report explains why that matters: the line runs from the eastern oilfields to the port of Yanbu on the Red Sea, letting Saudi oil reach Europe and Asia without passing through the Strait of Hormuz, and its importance has multiplied as Hormuz traffic has been restricted — Saudi Arabia moved part of its exports to it, up to four to five million barrels a day. It was struck on the nineteenth of Shahrivar; investigations indicate the attack came from Maysan province in Iraq, near the Iranian border, where armed groups aligned with the Islamic Republic operate. If flows do not resume within days, Saudi exports may fall and up to four per cent of world oil supply is at risk. Meanwhile the Houthis have advanced rapidly along Yemen's west coast — past southern Hodeidah, capturing the strategic port of Mokha, reaching the Hanish islands, then the coastal town of Dhubab and Perim island — placing them astride the route by which oil loaded at Yanbu reaches the Indian Ocean and Asian markets. The report draws the conclusion explicitly: the Islamic Republic's strategy is not only to threaten Hormuz, but that any route which gains importance as a way around Hormuz then meets a threat from Tehran or its proxies — with the aim of making the bypass expensive. And it notes the counter-effect: the more the oil routes are threatened, the greater the regional incentive to build routes independent of Hormuz.
This is the analytical spine the whole week's captures have been circling. Radio Farda and BBC Persian both reported the pipeline attack and the Iraqi border closures as events; this explains the geography that connects them, names the province the drone came from, and states the strategy as a proposition that can be judged. RESERVATION: the origin of the attack is attributed to unnamed 'investigations', and the eastern oilfield's name is garbled in transcription.
Leila Morvati, a political analyst in Helsinki, argues that having constrained Hormuz the Islamic Republic now seeks to constrain Bab al-Mandab as well, which would be very dangerous for Saudi Arabia since restricting both straits means cutting the oil and energy exports its economy rests on. She says the Houthis appear already to control much of Bab al-Mandab, giving them command over the corridors through which energy moves to Europe and Asia. Riyadh is asking Washington for military and intelligence help because the question matters to America too, and because it does not want the Islamic Republic's regional presence to grow further or the balance to shift; she also ties it to Saudi economic programmes that depend on secure energy supply. But she doubts the United States will go beyond intelligence and logistical support, given that it said from the outset it would not enter a direct military war with the Houthis. The presenter is putting the follow-up question when the recording ends.
RESERVATION: this item is incomplete. The job was clamped to twenty-five minutes so that Doha could be handed to it from the 17900 kHz capture, and the programme continues past the end of the recording.